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 This article reports on two cases decided by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court during its 2003-04 term.  The first is a major 
insurance coverage “trigger-and-allocation” case; the second is a tax 
case with implications for insurance coverage of electronic 
property. 
In 2003, the supreme court decided In re Silicone Implant 
 
       † Robert P. Thavis is a 1980 honors graduate of Yale Law School.  Since 
graduation he has practiced at the Minneapolis office of Leonard, Street and 
Deinard, where he is a shareholder and the founder of the firm’s insurance 
coverage practice group, which focuses on the representation of corporate 
policyholders in coverage disputes.  Mr. Thavis is a frequent author and lecturer at 
local and national seminars on topics of insurance coverage law. 
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Insurance Coverage Litigation (“In re Silicone”),1 a decision which 
clarified the effect of prior rulings in two areas.  First and most 
significantly, the court re-addressed the trilogy of “allocation” 
decisions authored by then-Chief Justice Keith during the mid-
1990s.2  Second, the supreme court declined an opportunity to 
expand the circumstances in which a policyholder successful in a 
coverage action may collect attorney fees incurred in that coverage 
action.3 
In the 2004 tax case Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue,4 the supreme court clarified some, and modified other, 
prior rulings as to whether electronic data constitutes “tangible 
personal property” under Minnesota sales tax statutes.5  The Sprint 
Spectrum court concluded that electronic telephone transmissions 
constituted “tangible personal property,” adding to Minnesota’s 
body of case law supporting coverage for damage or loss to 
computer and other electronic data and programs.6 
II. TRIGGER AND ALLOCATION 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in In re Silicone arose 
out of coverage litigation between 3M and a number of its 
insurers.7  3M sought coverage, in relevant part, for sums paid to 
settle lawsuits brought against it by women who claimed to have 
been injured by the implantation of silicone-filled breast implants 
manufactured by 3M or its predecessors-in-interest.8  The supreme 
court used In re Silicone to clarify the “trigger and allocation” rules it 
adopted and applied in a series of earlier decisions that determined 
coverage under consecutively issued comprehensive general 
liability (“CGL”) policies.9 
The “trigger” concept addresses what sort of event activates, or 
triggers, the insurer’s coverage obligation under any single CGL 
policy.10  The issue of “allocation,” in turn, relates to the 
methodology used to prioritize coverage obligations when more 
 
 1. 667 N.W.2d 405 (Minn. 2003). 
 2. Id. at 417-22. 
 3. Id. at 422-25. 
 4. 676 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2004). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 665. 
 7. In re Silicone, 667 N.W.2d at 408. 
 8. Id. at 410. 
 9. Id. at 413-22. 
 10. Id. at 414. 
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then one CGL coverage period has been “triggered” by an insured 
event, or series of insured events, resulting in one loss.11  Thus, 
“trigger and allocation” might be viewed as the Abbott and Costello 
of the coverage world: just as Lou Costello’s punch line needed 
Bud Abbott’s straight man set-up, the punch line question of 
“allocation” requires the set-up of a “trigger” determination.  A 
handful of different competing trigger rules and competing 
allocation methodologies have been adopted by the courts of 
various states. 
During the 1990s the Minnesota Supreme Court decided three 
cases in which it adopted and applied rules to govern the allocation 
of coverage obligations between consecutively-issued CGL policies: 
Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York 
(“NSP”);12 SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. (“SCSC”);13 and 
Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co. (“Domtar”).14  All three 
decisions were authored by then-Chief Justice Sandy Keith.15  
Although each was a clear decision, the three proved difficult to 
integrate into a cohesive rule, with the result that the practitioner 
was sometimes left wondering “Who’s on first?”  With benefit of 
hindsight, it becomes clear that the primary reason for the 
confusion was that the decisions clearly enunciated Minnesota’s 
allocation rule, but did not adequately address the difficulties of 
applying the state’s trigger rule. 
A. Northern States Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New 
York 
In NSP, the first of Minnesota’s allocation cases, NSP sought 
coverage, under policies with no pollution exclusion, for damages 
and clean-up costs resulting from long-term environmental 
contamination.16  NSP’s coverage dispute raised questions of both 
trigger and allocation.17  The NSP court first noted four competing 
approaches to the trigger question, but engaged in no debate 
among them, declaring that Minnesota’s rule was already settled: 
 
 11. See, e.g., N. States Power Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 
662 (Minn. 1994). 
 12. 523 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1994). 
 13. 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995). 
 14. 563 N.W.2d 724 (Minn. 1997). 
 15. Domtar, Inc., 563 N.W.2d at 728; SCSC Corp., 536 N.W.2d at 308; N. States 
Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 658. 
 16. N. States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 659. 
 17. Id. at 659-60. 
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[C]ourts tend to follow one of four “trigger” theories to 
determine which policies were “on the risk:”  the 
“exposure” rule, whereby only those policies in effect 
when the claimant or property was exposed to hazardous 
materials are triggered; the “manifestation” rule, whereby 
only those policies in effect when the injury or damage 
was discovered are triggered; the “continuous trigger” 
where the policies in effect at the time of exposure, the 
time of manifestation, and all the time in between are 
triggered; and the “actual injury” or “injury-in-fact” 
trigger, whereby only those policies in effect when 
damage occurred are triggered . . . . Minnesota follows the 
“actual injury” or “injury-in-fact” theory to determine 
which policies have been triggered by an occurrence 
causing damages for which an insured is liable.18 
The NSP court then explained Minnesota’s “actual injury” rule 
in (somewhat) greater detail: 
The essence of the actual injury trigger theory is that each 
insurer is held liable for only those damages which 
occurred during its policy period; no insurer is held liable 
for damages outside its policy period.  Where the policy 
periods do not overlap, therefore, the insurers are 
consecutively, not concurrently liable.19 
With that, the NSP court promptly moved on to determine 
what rule of allocation would fit best with Minnesota’s “actual 
injury” trigger rule.20  The court first brushed aside the majority “all 
sums”21 approach, not on the merits, but on the ground that NSP 
was no longer advocating the “all sums” approach on appeal after 
its rejection by the trial court below.22  Instead, the supreme court 
noted that on appeal NSP urged a “pro rata by limits” allocation,23 
 
 18. Id. at 662. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. In an “all sums” approach, all triggered policies are jointly and severally 
obligated to provide coverage, and the policyholder may select which policies to 
exhaust. See TOD ZUCKERMAN ET AL., 2 ENVIRONMENT INSURANCE LITIGATION: LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 10:11 (2004).  An insurer’s remedy to claimed overpayment, if any, 
would be a contribution action against the other insurers.  See  N. States Power Co., 
523 N.W.2d at 660 n.4. 
 22. N. States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 662. 
 23. In a “pro rata by limits” approach, each triggered year of coverage is 
assessed its “share” based on the amount, or limits, of coverage purchased in that 
year.  See ZUCKERMAN, supra note 21.  Thus, a year in which $10 million of coverage 
was purchased would make twice the indemnity payment of a year in which only $5 
million in coverage was purchased. 
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but the court rejected that as well, as “inconsistent with the actual 
injury trigger theory.”24 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals had applied an allocation 
scheme that apportioned damages “as proven; in other words, each 
policy would cover only those damages that are allocable to harm 
which occurred during the policy period.”25  The NSP court noted 
that the “as proven” rule would be consistent with an actual injury 
trigger.26  However, the supreme court further acknowledged that 
the “as proven” rule, being a fact-based test, would be more likely to 
foster costly litigation to determine what harm resulted in what 
policy year and less likely to foster early settlements.27  The supreme 
court also noted the resulting unfairness of requiring a 
policyholder to shoulder the burden of proving not just a right to 
coverage and the policyholder’s total damages, but also the amount 
of its damages which occurred in each policy period.28  Thus, the 
supreme court declared the “as proven” rule to be “unattractive 
given the scientific complexity of the issues involved, the extended 
period of time over which damages may have occurred before 
discovery, and the number of parties potentially involved.”29 
Instead, the NSP court adopted a “pro rata by time on the risk” 
allocation rule.30  The NSP court explained that its “time on the 
risk” rule would provide “the same result [as the court of appeals’ 
‘as proven’ methodology] when, as may be the case here, the 
damages are continuous over all policy periods.”31  However, the 
“time on the risk” rule also had the perceived advantage of being 
“attractive for its simplicity,” given that it would be less fact-
dependent in application.32 
That is because under the “pro rata by time on the risk” rule, a 
policyholder need show only (i) that “damage began on a 
particular date, X, and ended on, or was discovered at, a later date, 
Y . . . and [(ii)] the total amount of damages for which coverage 
may exist,”33 but need not show how much damage fell into each 
 
 24. N. States Power Co., 523 N.W.2d at 662. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 663. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 662-63. 
 32. Id. at 663. 
 33. Id. at 663-64. 
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policy period.  Rather, the trial court presumes that the damages in 
a contamination case like NSP fall evenly 
from the first point at which damages occurred to the 
time of discovery, cleanup[,] or whenever the last 
triggered policy period ended.  Each triggered policy 
therefore bears a share of the total damages 
proportionate to the number of years it was on the risk 
relative to the total number of years of coverage 
triggered.34 
This presumption that “damages were continuous from the 
point of the first damage to the point of discovery or clean up [sic]” 
is sufficient to shift the burden to the insurer(s) to establish how 
much damage actually occured in a given policy year.35  Absent 
such a showing, coverage is apportioned equally to each year of 
triggered coverage. 
Notwithstanding its adoption of this new rule, the NSP court 
took pains not to set the rule in stone.  First, the NSP decision 
noted that trial courts must have leeway to apply differing 
allocation rules based on the facts in each particular case: 
“Damages are by nature fact dependent and the trial courts must 
be given the flexibility to apportion them in a manner befitting 
each case.”36  Second, the NSP court volunteered that its allocation 
rule could change as insurance coverage law continued to 
develop.37  These comments were viewed as clear indications that 
the door was not closed to alternative arguments in future cases, 
and may help explain why NSP was only the first in a series of 
decisions respecting allocation. 
What sometimes has been overlooked in subsequent analyses 
of the NSP rule, however, were the limits imposed on that rule by 
the context within which it was announced.  In NSP, the entire 
analysis described above began with the supreme court describing 
the particular type of loss giving rise to NSP’s claim for insurance 
coverage as an “environmental liability” claim.38  The NSP decision 
then noted that  
 environmental liability insurance cases raise a variety of 
issues, such as: what “trigger theory” should a court apply 
 
 34. Id. at 663. 
 35. Id. at 664. 
 36. Id. at 663. 
 37. Id. at 665. 
 38. Id. at 660-61. 
6
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 4
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/4
THAVIS (CB & CKI & LSK).DOC 11/14/2004  4:20:27 PM 
2004] DRAWING THE LINES MORE BRIGHTLY 457 
to determine which policies are at issue; are the damages 
excluded by various provisions in the policies, such as the 
“owned property” and pollution exclusions; how should a 
court determine the number of “occurrences” under the 
policies; what method of allocation between successive 
insurers is most appropriate . . . .39   
A few paragraphs later, the NSP court’s entire discussion of the four 
competing trigger rules, which set the stage for its analysis of 
allocation, began with the words “[i]n these cases,” meaning 
“environmental liability insurance cases.” 40 
Thus, while perhaps not initially clear, the conclusion is 
inescapable when viewed in hindsight.  The allocation rules 
debated in NSP were being debated with respect to, and NSP’s 
“time on the risk” rule was intended to apply to, only those 
situations such as long-term environmental contamination 
coverage cases, in which coverage from multiple CGL policy 
periods was triggered.  Certainly, NSP made clear that its “time on 
the risk” rule was never intended to apply if only one year’s 
coverage was triggered, since there would be no need to allocate at 
all.41  What was missing, however, was clarity as to when Minnesota’s 
“actual injury” trigger rule triggered consecutive policies, and when 
it triggered only one. 
B. SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co. 
That issue became a bit clearer the year after NSP when the 
supreme court issued its decision in SCSC.42  In SCSC, the damage 
was again environmental, but the insurers and SCSC disputed 
whether the environmental damage was the result of one sudden 
and accidental spill of contaminants in 1977, which would have 
been covered, or was the result of long-term gradual 
contamination, for which coverage would likely have been 
excluded under the policies’ “sudden and accidental” pollution 
exclusions.43  That fact question was resolved at trial, with the jury 
 
 39. Id. at 661. 
 40. Id. at 662. 
 41. Id. at 663. 
 42. SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305 (Minn. 1995). 
 43. Id. at 310.  The “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusion, typically in 
use during the period from 1973-1986, purported to exclude coverage for 
pollution losses other than those resulting from a “sudden and accidental” 
occurrence.  Irene A. Sullivan and Timothy G. Reynolds, Hazardous Waste 
Litigation: Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Coverage Issues, PRACTISING L. 
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agreeing with SCSC that at least some damage stemmed from one 
“sudden and accidental” spill in 1977.44  It further found that 
damage from that one spill continued for years thereafter, and that 
that continuing damage from the 1977 spill was indistinguishable 
from any damage that might have resulted from any gradual 
contamination.45  The trial court therefore found NSP’s “time on 
the risk” allocation rule inapplicable. 
However, under Minnesota law, if any cause of an indivisible 
loss is covered, then the entire loss is covered, absent proof by the 
insurer that an uncovered cause was the “overriding” cause of loss.46  
Since the insurers in SCSC failed to establish any “overriding” cause 
of loss at trial, SCSC was entitled to full coverage for its entire loss.47  
In deciding which insurers owed what portion of that coverage, the 
trial court applied a “vertical exhaustion” allocation formula, in 
which all coverage in place during 1977, the first year of covered 
loss, would be exhausted, followed by the 1978 policies, and then 
those from 1979, 1980, and so on.48 
The supreme court accepted the finding that the one event of 
contamination in 1977 triggered the coverage in place in 1977, and 
that since no insurer established any other “overriding” cause of 
loss, the entire loss was covered.49  The supreme court further 
accepted that the contaminants spilled in 1977 continued to cause 
additional damage to the environment, including by working their 
way into the groundwater, for years thereafter.50  The SCSC court 
therefore agreed that NSP was distinguishable as involving 
continuing insurable event(s), while all of SCSC’s covered damage 
was traceable solely to the 1977 spill.51  Thus, the supreme court 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling that NSP’s “time on the risk” rule 
was inapplicable.52 
However, the SCSC court rejected the trial court’s substitute 
“vertical” allocation approach, concluding that if an insurable event 
 
INST. 279, 331 (1997). 
 44. SCSC Corp., 536 N.W.2d at 310. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Henning Nelson Constr. Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 383 
N.W.2d 645, 653 (Minn. 1986); Campbell v. Ins. Serv. Agency, 424 N.W.2d 785, 
789 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). 
 47. SCSC Corp., 536 N.W.2d at 310. 
 48. Id. at 317. 
 49. Id. at 318. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 317-18. 
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occurred only in 1977, then only that one year of insurance 
covered loss from that insured event.53  It did not matter if damage 
from that insured event continued beyond 1977, or whether 
damage from post-1977 uninsured events was covered by virtue of 
Minnesota’s “contributing loss” rule; any such damage did not 
trigger any additional policies’ coverage.54  If the limits of that 1977 
coverage were insufficient to cover the policyholder’s full covered 
loss, then that loss was simply under-insured. 
Thus, in NSP the supreme court had articulated a rule under 
which repeated long-term insured events of environmental 
contamination triggered policies during the entire period of 
contamination and, absent evidence to the contrary, the injury was 
presumed to be equal in each year of contamination, resulting in a 
loss spread equally over the number of years of coverage during the 
period of contamination.  In SCSC, however, the supreme court 
had articulated the flip-side of that rule: when the insurable event 
was not a continuing one, then only insurance from the year of the 
insurable event was triggered, regardless of whether that insurable 
event resulted in covered loss or damage in later years.  In short, 
after SCSC, the NSP decision appeared to be limited to only those 
cases in which repeated insurable events (such as gradual, long-
term contamination or exposure) triggered multiple years of 
coverage. 
C. Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Insurance Co. 
Apparently believing that its rule of NSP and SCSC was less 
than crystal clear, however, the supreme court sought to “clarify” 
the rule of NSP and SCSC in Domtar just two years later. 
Domtar, like NSP, involved long-term, gradual contamination, 
and the result in Domtar was therefore the application of NSP’s rule 
of “time on the risk” allocation.55  However, the supreme court 
introduced a twist unfavorable to policyholders.  In Domtar, the 
court determined that the period of contamination ran for sixty-
four years following the first damage.56  However, because some 
older policies were lost and some insurers that had issued more 
recent policies (with “sudden and accidental” pollution exclusions) 
 
 53. Id. at 318. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 732-33 (Minn. 
1997). 
 56. Id. at 732. 
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had settled, Domtar sought coverage for only fifteen of those sixty-
four years.57  Domtar argued that under NSP’s “time on the risk” 
rule, its covered loss should be allocated equally among the fifteen 
years of triggered coverage.58  The supreme court, however, held 
that the denominator used to establish each insurer’s fractional 
liability was sixty-four years, even if insurance coverage had been 
available in only fifteen of those years.59  That had the effect of 
leaving the policyholder uninsured as to 49/64ths of its loss.60 
More importantly for the later interpretation of the NSP/SCSC 
rule, the Domtar court distinguished between NSP and SCSC not in 
the abstract, but once again in the context of long-term 
environmental contamination.61  As a result, the Domtar opinion 
placed a greater emphasis on the NSP decision than on SCSC.  
Indeed, following almost two pages of discussion of the NSP 
decision, the Domtar court dismissed SCSC in a single paragraph: 
The proper scope of coverage will also depend on the 
facts of the case.  When environmental contamination 
arises from discrete and identifiable events, then the 
actual-injury trigger theory allows those policies on the 
risk at the point of initial contamination to pay for all 
property damage that follows.  See SCSC Corp. v. Allied Mut. 
Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 305, 318 (Minn. 1995) (despite 
continuing damage from leaching of chemicals into the 
groundwater after the policy period, only the primary and 
excess policies on the risk at the time of the discharge 
were triggered, but those policies responded to the entire 
loss).62 
Then, in a passage with implications for In re Silicone, the 
Domtar court went on to describe the limits on NSP’s “time on the 
risk” allocation rule: “It is only in those difficult cases in which 
property damage is both continuous and so intermingled as to be 
 
 57. Id. at 731. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 732-33. 
 60. The Domtar court asserted that NSP was already clear on this issue and did 
not acknowledge Domtar as constituting a change to the rule of NSP.  Id. at 733-36.  
However, the NSP decision had actually declared that “[e]ach triggered policy 
therefore bears a share of the total damages proportionate to the number of years 
it was on the risk relative to the total number of years of coverage triggered.”  523 N.W.2d 
at 663 (emphasis added). 
 61. Domtar, Inc., 563 N.W.2d at 732-33. 
 62. Id. at 733. 
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practically indivisible that NSP properly applies.”63  The problem 
with that pronouncement was that the Domtar court apparently did 
not mean that NSP applied in all “cases in which property damage is . 
. . continuous.”64  Rather, it meant only that NSP applied to those 
cases in which continuous property damage is the result of 
continuing insured events. 
D. In re Silicone Implant Insurance Coverage Litigation 
In In re Silicone, the supreme court undertook its first post-
Keith analysis and application of NSP, SCSC, and Domtar.  As in 
these three cases, the main question presented in In re Silicone was 
again one of “allocation.”  However, in In re Silicone, it becomes 
clear that, as in stand-up comedy, timing is everything in “trigger 
and allocation,” and it is the “trigger” issue which really steals the 
show. 
While the trilogy of NSP, SCSC and Domtar set the stage for the 
supreme court’s decision in In re Silicone, that stage also went 
through numerous “set changes” in proceedings below.  For while 
the supreme court issued its decision in In re Silicone in 2003, the 
action was first filed in 1994, prior even to the court’s decision in 
NSP.65  As such, the In re Silicone trial court was required to absorb 
and apply all three prior supreme court pronouncements on 
allocation.  Not surprisingly, this resulted in some changes in the 
allocation rulings by the trial court. 
Moreover, a key fact issue in In re Silicone, the identification of 
the triggering event, was not only disputed but was also 
complicated by the fact that both 3M and its insurers took the 
position that silicone breast implants caused no injury.66  While it is 
not unusual for a policyholder to settle underlying litigation 
without an admission of liability, in this case one of the keys to 
determining whether one, or more than one, coverage year was 
triggered was whether the injury to the underlying implant 
recipients was caused by one, or more than one, insurable event.67  
The trial court conducted a “medical trigger bench trial” in 1996 to 
determine trigger, but ultimately found itself required to 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. In re Silicone Implant Ins. Coverage Litig., 667 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Minn. 
2003). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 410-11. 
11
Thavis: Drawing the Lines More Brightly: The Minnesota Supreme Court Clar
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
THAVIS (CB & CKI & LSK).DOC 11/14/2004  4:20:27 PM 
462 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
determine whether an injury, which all of the experts agreed did 
not happen, happened in the way described by 3M’s experts, or in 
the manner described by the insurers’ experts.68 
The trial court’s first allocation ruling, coming after its 
“medical trigger bench trial,” was issued in July 1996, after the 
supreme court’s ruling in SCSC but before Domtar.69  Based on the 
medical expert testimony, the trial court determined that for 
purposes of the case, “[a]ctual-injury” occurred at or shortly after 
time of implantation, and that “[c]overage is triggered 
continuously for all policies in effect at the time of implant, at the 
time of manifestation of systemic disease symptoms, and at all times 
in between those events.”70  Thus, the trial court found the NSP 
allocation rule applicable.  That ruling was then clarified by an 
order changing “the end date of damages from ‘the time of 
manifestation of systemic disease symptoms’ to ‘the earlier of the 
implant recipient’s death, or the date on which the recipient files a 
lawsuit for damages.’”71 
However, the district court sua sponte vacated its July 1997 
decision in light of Domtar.72  At that point, the district court 
reasoned that the continuously occurring injuries were all the 
consequence of one discrete occurrence (the implantation), and 
that under Domtar, where “a single, discrete occurrence can be 
identified, the continuous trigger has no applicability.”73 
In 1997, the district court, upon full briefing by the parties, 
reinstated its original 1996 ruling by applying the NSP rule.74  This 
determination was based upon the trial court’s conclusion that “the 
injury at issue is not one injury with continuous leakage, but a 
consistently recurring injury that takes place each time silicone 
comes in contact with new cells, creating a new bioreaction.”75  In 
other words, the trial court concluded that “injury” began at or 
near the time of implantation, and both injury and damage 
continued thereafter. 
In reviewing the district court’s allocation decision, the 
supreme court concluded that in finding that this “recurring 
 
 68. Id. at 411. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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injury” triggered coverage in multiple policy periods,76 the district 
court “appears to have equated a ‘continuous trigger’ with a 
‘continuous injury,’ which is inaccurate.”77  Instead, the supreme 
court concluded that “injury” was the result of an insurable event, 
not the insurable event itself, and thus injury in multiple years was 
irrelevant to trigger.78  After affirming the district court’s finding 
that the insurable event occurred shortly after the time of 
implantation, the supreme court then concluded that under the 
“actual injury” trigger rule, “the policies were triggered at or about 
the time of implantation.”79  Hence, for each implant recipient’s 
claim, only one policy owed coverage. 
The In re Silicone court then concluded that the trial court’s 
incorrect conclusion that an implantation triggered multiple 
policies had resulted in the trial court incorrectly applying a “time 
on the risk” allocation.80  In addressing this aspect of the trial 
court’s conclusion, the In re Silicone court once again analyzed NSP, 
SCSC, and Domtar at some length, but this time with a somewhat 
different emphasis than in Domtar.81  The supreme court 
concluded: 
Domtar established guidelines for allocating losses from a 
continuing injury, like the immune diseases at issue here, 
using an injury-in-fact approach.  The first, and most 
obvious, is that only insurance policies that are 
appropriately “triggered” are on the risk.  Therefore, 
before an allocation discussion can occur, the district 
court needs to identify the triggered policies among 
which to allocate.  The second, and most helpful 
guideline in this case, is that when there is a continuing 
injury that “arises from discrete and identifiable events, 
then the actual injury trigger theory allows those policies 
on the risk at the point of initial contamination to pay for 
all property damage that follows.”  In other words, the 
issue of allocation should be raised only if the triggering 
injury does not “arise [ ] from discrete and identifiable 
events.”82 
In applying the rule of Domtar, the In re Silicone court then 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 414-15. 
 79. Id. at 417. 
 80. Id. at 417-22. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 420 (citation omitted). 
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articulated a two-step approach to claims of injury which do “not 
arise [ ] from discrete and identifiable events.”83 
First, we determine whether the plaintiffs’ injuries are 
continuous.  If they are not, under the actual-injury 
trigger theory, the policies on the risk at the time of the 
injury would pay all losses arising from that injury.  Here, 
the court found that the injuries are continuous, so we 
move to the next determination: whether the continuous 
injury arose from some discrete and identifiable event.  If 
it does, the policies on the risk at the time of that event 
are liable for all sums arising from the event.  If not, 
allocation may be appropriate.84 
The In re Silicone decision then concludes: 
In our actual-injury trigger framework, allocation is meant 
to be the exception and not the rule because “[i]t is only 
in those difficult cases” that allocation is appropriate.  
Domtar, 563 N.W.2d at 733.  If we can identify a discrete 
originating event that allows us to avoid allocation, we 
should do so.85 
Thus, notwithstanding Domtar’s suggestion that NSP was the 
correct rule and SCSC the exception, In re Silicone clarifies that 
SCSC, and now In re Silicone, are the rule.  NSP and Domtar are the 
exceptions.  The court suggests that NSP and Domtar are applicable 
only in cases, like gradual environmental contamination cases, in 
which an insurable event or events recurring over multiple years 
gives rise to a continuing injury. 
Viewed in the context of NSP, SCSC, Domtar, and In re Silicone, 
it is now clear that the “time on the risk” allocation rule was not the 
focus of dispute in any case since NSP.  Rather, what courts have 
struggled with is how to apply Minnesota’s “actual injury” trigger 
rule.  The punch line of allocation flows from the straight man’s 
set-up.  If policies from multiple years are triggered, “time on the 
risk” allocation will apply (absent contrary evidence assigning loss 
to particular periods).  However, if only one policy year is 
triggered, there is nothing to allocate. 
III. ATTORNEY FEES 
In re Silicone also addressed the issue of attorney fees, less 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 421. 
 85. Id. at 421-22. 
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confusing but nonetheless significant.  3M sought to recover its 
attorney fees incurred in defending against its insurer’s declaratory 
judgment action and prosecuting its counterclaims.86  Existing 
Minnesota law provides that a successful policyholder may recover 
attorney fees incurred in a coverage battle if the insurer has refused 
to provide a defense, or seeks a declaration of no duty to defend, 
whether it was the policyholder or the insurer that first brought the 
coverage suit.87  Here, however, 3M sought fees under policies that 
did not obligate 3M’s insurers to defend 3M, but instead required 
them to reimburse 3M’s defense costs.88  The supreme court 
refused to extend the attorney fees rule to that situation, 
explaining: 
3M asserts that in both cases the insured contracts to 
avoid the burdensome expense of litigation only to have 
litigation thrust upon it by the insurer in a coverage 
action.  We disagree . . . . As the insurers argue, if an 
insurer breaches its duty to defend, the insured must do 
twice what it contracted to avoid: hire attorneys and 
manage a lawsuit for both the underlying case and the 
declaratory judgment proceeding. 
In contrast, the agreement to reimburse the insured for 
defense costs by its high-level, excess insurance providers 
does not involve the promise to relieve the insured from 
the burdens of litigation . . . . An agreement to reimburse 
the insured’s defense costs is simply an agreement for the 
payment of money.  Attorney fees are not recoverable in 
declaratory judgment actions to establish that the insurer 
must pay the insured money.89 
In terms of precedent, the supreme court’s decision is 
unremarkable.  The court’s reasoning, however, is subject to 
challenge on the ground that there is no articulated basis for 
treating a breach of a contractual obligation to do something other 
than pay money differently from a breach of a contractual 
obligation to pay money.  This is particularly true because insurers 
that owe a defense are not deemed in breach of that duty if they 
 
 86. Id. at 422. 
 87. Id.; see also Morrison v. Swenson, 142 N.W.2d 640 (Minn. 1966) (holding 
that where an insurer denies liability and a declaratory action is brought, the 
alleged insured, if successful, is entitled to recover legal fees caused by the 
insurer’s breach of contract).  
 88. In re Silicone, 667 N.W.2d at 424. 
 89. Id. at 425. 
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reserve their right to disclaim coverage and allow or require the 
policyholder to defend herself, while reimbursing the policyholder 
for her costs incurred in doing so.90 
However, the most fundamental problem with the court’s 
holding regarding attorney fees is that the court missed an 
opportunity to reconcile two competing views of an insurer’s 
obligations to its policyholder.  While In re Silicone treated 3M’s 
insurers’ obligations as merely contractual (and treated a 
contractual obligation to defend as different in kind from a 
contractual obligation to pay defense costs), other Minnesota 
decisions have previously acknowledged that an insurer’s policy 
obligations are not merely contractual.91  Rather, once coverage is 
triggered, the insurer becomes a fiduciary and will be held 
responsible for acting in the best interests of its insured.92 
United States District Court Judge Ann Montgomery of the 
District of Minnesota has recently sought to reconcile that 
dichotomy by concluding that an insurer’s fiduciary duties and 
good faith obligations arise only once an insurer accepts control of 
the settlement of claims, which, in turn, arises only upon that 
insurer’s acceptance of its duty to defend.93  Thus, under Miller, 
3M’s duty to reimburse defense costs, rather than defend directly, 
would not likely give rise to any fiduciary or good faith duties by the 
insurer.94  However, an insurer may owe duties to settle, or to 
contribute toward a settlement, even absent a duty to defend, 
especially under a “defense cost reimbursement” policy.  In any 
event, it is an issue that would have benefited from clarification by 
the Minnesota Supreme Court. 
IV. ELECTRONIC DATA AS TANGIBLE PROPERTY 
In Sprint Spectrum, the supreme court decided a fairly narrow 
sales tax case.95  In doing so, however, it affirmed and strengthened 
 
 90. Prahm v. Rupp Constr. Co., 277 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1979). 
 91. Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384 (Minn. 1983); Kissoondath v. 
United States Fire Ins. Co., 620 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); Northfield Ins. 
Co. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 545 N.W.2d 57 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996). 
 92. Short, 334 N.W.2d at 387. 
 93. Miller v. ACE USA, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1140-41, 91 Fair Empl. Prac. 
Cas. (BNA) 1521 (D. Minn. 2003). 
 94. Indeed, under one reading of Miller, an insurer could avoid its fiduciary 
responsibility by breaching its duty to defend, giving the insurer a significant 
incentive to breach its defense obligations.  See id. 
 95. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 676 N.W.2d 656, 658 
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a growing body of Minnesota law recognizing electronic data as 
(insured) tangible property.96 
Some background is useful in interpreting Sprint Spectrum.  
While numerous courts have recently addressed whether electronic 
data is tangible property, including under CGL and property 
policies, Minnesota has addressed the issue, as the saying goes, 
“early and often.”  As such, it has one of the most developed bodies 
of law on the issue.  That law breaks down into tax cases and 
coverage cases. 
A. Minnesota Tax Law Cases 
One line of “tangible property” cases has arisen under 
Minnesota’s tax statute, which itself has been amended over time.  
The line begins in 1977, when the supreme court decided Fingerhut 
Products Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue.97  In that case, Fingerhut 
sought to avoid taxation by claiming that its mailing lists were not 
“tangible personal property” under section 297A.14 of the 
Minnesota Statutes.98  The supreme court found that the use of the 
names and addresses on the lists was not a taxable use of tangible 
property, since what was being used was the information on the list, 
and the form of the communication of the data was irrelevant or 
incidental to Fingerhut’s use.99  However, the supreme court 
further found that when Fingerhut purchased mailing labels with 
preprinted names and addresses, the use of mailing labels was use 
of tangible property, since the physical form of the information was 
a part of its value.100 
Legislative changes set the stage for subsequent cases.  In 1984, 
the Minnesota Legislature exempted purchases of “capital 
equipment” from a portion of Minnesota’s sales tax, and in 1989 
this became a full exemption.101  Section 297A.01, subdivision 16(a) 
originally defined capital equipment as “machinery and equipment 
. . . used by the purchaser or lessee for manufacturing, fabricating, 
 
(Minn. 2004). 
 96. See id. at 665; Zip Sort, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 567 N.W.2d 34, 40 
(Minn. 1997); Fingerhut Prods. Co. v.  Comm’r of Revenue, 258 N.W.2d 606, 610 
(Minn. 1977). 
 97. 258 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. 1977). 
 98. Id. at 608; see MINN. STAT. § 297A.14 (1971) (current version at MINN. 
STAT. § 297A.63, subd. 2 (2004)). 
 99. Fingerhut, 258 N.W.2d at 610. 
 100. Id.; see MINN. STAT. §§ 297A.14, 297.14 (1989) (amended 2000). 
 101. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 658-59. 
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mining, quarrying, or refining a product to be sold at retail.”102  In 
1993, the statute was amended.103  One change was to replace “a 
product” in the text quoted above with “tangible personal 
property.”104 
In Minnesota RSA 10 Ltd. Partnership v. Commissioner of 
Revenue,105 the pre-1993 version of the statute was found applicable 
to the purchase of cellular telephone system equipment, which 
“does not merely deliver communications, but also ‘creates the 
signal required to transmit voice or data.’”106  As such, RSA 10’s 
telephone equipment was deemed to have been used to 
manufacture, fabricate or refine a “product.”107  However, in an 
earlier decision in that case (the decision in which the 1993 
“tangible personal property” version of the statute was deemed 
inapplicable), the tax court concluded that “[t]he words ‘product’ 
and ‘tangible personal property’ are not synonymous . . . . RSA 10 . 
. . agrees that the [e]quipment is not used to manufacture tangible 
personal property.”108  The tax court was affirmed without opinion 
by an equally divided supreme court.109 
However, in 1997, the supreme court itself analyzed the 1993 
legislative changes in Northern States Power Co. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue.110  NSP was seeking to avoid sales taxation on transformers, 
which the Commissioner of Revenue contended were used to 
produce electricity, an “intangible” product.111  The supreme court 
disagreed, noting that it had ruled electricity a “product” under the 
pre-1993 statute and determining by reference to legislative history 
that no narrowing of the prior 1993 exception was intended by the 
1993 amendments.112 
Also in 1997, the supreme court decided Zip Sort, Inc. v. 
 
 102. MINN. STAT. § 297A.01, subd. 16(a) (1992). 
 103. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 659. 
 104. Act of May 24, 1993, ch. 375, art. 9, § 25, subd. 16, 1993 Minn. Laws 2728, 
2897 (codified as amended at MINN. STAT. § 297A.01, subd. 16(a) (Supp. 1993)). 
 105. No. 6481, 1997 WL 410997 (Minn. T.C. July 18, 1997), aff’d by an equally 
divided court, 581 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 1998). 
 106. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 661 (quoting RSA 10, 1997 WL 
410997, at *3). 
 107. RSA 10, 1997 WL 410997, at *2-3. 
 108. Minn. RSA 10 Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r of Revenue, No. 6481, 1996 WL 
53858, at *3 (Minn. T.C. Feb. 6, 1996). 
 109. Minn. RSA 10 Ltd. P’ship v. Comm’r of Revenue, 581 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 
1998). 
 110. 571 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1997). 
 111. Id. at 575. 
 112. Id. at 575-76. 
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Commissioner of Revenue,113 another sales tax case.  In this case, the 
supreme court concluded that bar codes added to mail constituted 
tangible property under the amended version of Minnesota 
Statutes section 297A.01, subdivision 16(a).114  In addressing 
whether the bar codes constituted tangible property, this time the 
supreme court did not rely on legislative history but instead 
conducted an analysis of the nature of tangible property.  First, it 
noted the statutory definition of “tangible personal property” as 
“corporeal personal property of any kind.”115  The court also noted 
that Black’s Law Dictionary “defines ‘corporeal property’ as ‘all 
things which may be perceived by any of the bodily senses . . . 
although a common definition of the word includes merely that 
which can be touched and seen.’”116  The court concluded, 
however, that “the statutory language is not all that helpful,” and 
instead turned to its 1977 Fingerhut decision for guidance.117  
Ultimately, the Zip Sort court concluded that the bar code was 
tangible personal property because the consumer was buying “more 
than the information contained in the bar code, it [was] paying for a 
particular ‘form’ of this information.”118 
Then, in 2001, the tax court decided Qwest Corp. v. 
Commissioner of Revenue.119  In Qwest, the tax court concluded that 
the 1993 amendment to Minnesota Statutes section 287A.01, 
subdivision 16(a) did narrow the exemption, based on the court’s 
reading of the meaning of “product” as contrasted with “tangible 
personal property” (and citing the first tax court order in RSA 
10).120  “Tangible personal property,” in turn, was defined in 
Minnesota Statutes section 297A.01, subdivision 11, as “corporeal 
personal property of any kind.”121  The Qwest tax court therefore 
turned to Black’s Law Dictionary for a definition of “corporeal:” 
Such as affects the senses, and may be seen and handled, 
as opposed to incorporeal property, which cannot be seen 
 
 113. 567 N.W.2d 34 (Minn. 1997). 
 114. Id. at 40. 
 115. Id.; MINN. STAT. § 297A.01, subd. 11 (1996). 
 116. Zip Sort, 567 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 343 (6th ed. 
1990)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 119. Nos. 7214-R, 7283-R, 2001 WL 355861 (Minn. T.C. April 2, 2001), aff’d by 
an evenly divided court, 640 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. 2002), abrogated by Sprint Spectrum, 
L.P. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 676 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2004). 
 120. Id. at *3-4. 
 121. Id. at *2. 
19
Thavis: Drawing the Lines More Brightly: The Minnesota Supreme Court Clar
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
THAVIS (CB & CKI & LSK).DOC 11/14/2004  4:20:27 PM 
470 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
or handled . . . . In modern law, all things which may be 
perceived by any of the bodily senses are termed 
corporeal, although a common definition of the word 
includes merely that which can be touched and seen.122 
It also cited Black’s definition of tangible property: “property 
that has physical form and substance and is not intangible.  That 
which may be felt or touched and is necessarily corporeal, although 
it may be real or personal.”123  Declaring that Minnesota Statutes 
section 645.08, subdivision 1, requires one to assign “common and 
approved” usage to statutory language, the Qwest tax court adopted 
the “common definition” of corporeal and concluded that 
telephone service was not “tangible personal property.”124 
The supreme court review involved only four justices, who split 
2-2, resulting in an affirmance, without opinion, by an equally 
divided court.125 
B. Minnesota Insurance Coverage Cases 
Minnesota’s foray into the physical nature of electronic data 
for purposes of insurance coverage arguably began with Magnetic 
Data, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.126  Although the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in Magnetic Data technically declined to 
address the issue of whether the erasure of data constituted 
damage to “tangible” property,127 that case has been read by some 
as suggesting that data constitutes intangible, uninsured, 
property.128  In Magnetic Data, the insured mistakenly erased data on 
computer disk cartridges it had been asked to inspect.129  In 
determining that there was no coverage, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court stated in dicta: “[W]e find that the intent to limit coverage to 
loss of use of tangible property remains.  Therefore, absent clear 
language to the contrary, we decline to interpret this CGL policy to 
 
 122. Id. at *2-3 (quoting BLACK’S, supra note 116). 
 123. Id. (quoting BLACK’S, supra note 116, at 1456). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Qwest Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 640 N.W.2d 351 (Minn. 2002). 
 126. 442 N.W.2d 153 (Minn. 1989). 
 127. Id. at 156. 
 128. See, e.g., Hazel Glenn Beh, Physical Losses in Cyberspace,  8 CONN. INS. L.J. 55, 
63 n.37 (2002) (summarizing Magnetic Data as “suggesting but not determining 
that under a CGL policy, accidental erasure of data from client's disk does not 
constitute loss of use of tangible property”). 
 129. Id. at 154. 
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extend coverage to loss of use of intangible property.”130  The court 
then proceeded, however, to specifically decline to decide whether 
data constituted tangible or intangible property.131  Rather, the 
court reasoned it did not have to decide the issue because (i) if the 
data was intangible, there was no “property damage” and so the loss 
was not covered; and (ii) if it the data was tangible property, then 
the claim was excluded under the “care, custody and control” 
exclusion.132 
Two years later, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the 
issue in Retail Systems, Inc. v. CNA Insurance Cos.133 and found that 
both computer tape, and the data on that tape, were tangible 
property.134  In doing so, it noted that Magnetic Data did not reach 
the issue135 and also distinguished Fingerhut on the grounds that “it 
[is] inappropriate to apply tax law to the interpretation of an 
insurance policy.  Moreover, Fingerhut did not consider the 
tangibility of computer tapes or data.  Finally . . . sales tax law . . . 
has since been amended to state that this material is tangible 
property for tax purposes.”136 
Finally, the Retail Systems court found that other jurisdictions 
were split on whether “recorded material is tangible property for 
tax purposes.”137  After noting that Minnesota’s statute appeared to 
parallel the smaller number of decisions from states finding that 
recorded material was tangible property,138 the court nonetheless 
declared that “we have considered whether these tax precedents 
should govern an insurance case and conclude that they should 
not.”139  While undoubtedly correct, this statement did not appear 
to end citation of tax cases by coverage counsel. 
However, shortly thereafter, the Minnesota Court of Appeals 
held that misappropriation of proprietary information did not 
constitute “property damage” under a CGL policy because the 
information was not deemed “tangible.”140  In that case, the court 
 
 130. Id. at 156. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. 469 N.W.2d 735 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). 
 134. Id. at 738. 
 135. Id. at 737. 
 136. Id. at 738 n.1. 
 137. Id. at 737. 
 138. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 297A.01, subd. 11 (1990)). 
 139. Id. at 738. 
 140. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Computer Sys., Inc., 490 N.W.2d 
626, 631 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
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relied on the American Heritage Dictionary definition of “tangible” 
as: “1.a. Discernible by the touch; capable of being touched; 
palpable. b. Capable of being treated as fact; real; concrete; tangible 
evidence.”141  The court concluded that the proprietary information 
was not tangible because it was not capable of being touched.142 
Although less than directly on point, it is worth noting that the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals, in Sentinel Management Co. v. New 
Hampshire Insurance Co.,143 found “direct physical loss” from the 
presence of asbestos in a building because its presence affected the 
building’s function.144  In 2001, the Minnesota Court of Appeals, 
relying heavily on Sentinel Management, decided General Mills, Inc. v. 
Gold Medal Insurance Co.145  In General Mills, food was sprayed with a 
cheaper, unapproved version of a substance chemically 
indistinguishable from the name-brand product that the FDA 
required be used.146  Even if food was chemically identical to what it 
was supposed to be and is “not dangerous for human consumption,” 
the “FDA treats the presence of an unapproved chemical as an illegal 
adulteration of food products” and deems the food unusable.147  The 
court of appeals concluded that the unusable food was “physically 
damaged” by virtue of its inability to be used for its intended 
purpose.148 
C. Insurance Coverage Cases From Other Jurisdictions 
While a few other states addressed the insurable nature of 
electronic data prior to 2000, it is primarily since that date that 
courts have begun to directly address whether damage to such data 
constitutes “direct physical damage or loss.”  In American Guarantee 
& Liability Insurance Co. v. Ingram Micro, Inc.149 the federal district 
court in Arizona concluded that data loss, including loss of use, did 
constitute “direct physical damage or loss,” but did so primarily on 
a public policy basis, rather than an interpretation of existing law 
 
 141. Id. at 631 (emphasis in original) (quoting AM. HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1242 
(2d Coll. Ed. 1982)). 
 142. Id. 
 143. 563 N.W.2d 296 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
 144. Id. at 300-01. 
 145. 622 N.W.2d 147 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001). 
 146. Id. at 150. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 152. 
 149. No. 99-185, 2000 WL 726789 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 2000). 
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or policy language.150 
The next major decision, America Online, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury 
Insurance Co.,151 rejected Ingram Micro, albeit in deciding coverage 
under a CGL policy, which references “physical damage to tangible 
property,”152 not “direct physical loss or damage.”153 
Notwithstanding America Online, the Court of Appeals of New 
Mexico found coverage under a CGL policy for loss of data 
destroyed on a computer hard drive.154  Then, in Lambrecht & 
Associates, Inc. v. State Farm Lloyds,155 the Texas Court of Appeals 
found that the physical loss from the corporate policyholder’s 
computer system malfunction, the result of a hacker’s virus, 
required the replacement of the entire system.156 
In Cincinnati Insurance Co. v. Professional Data Services, Inc.,157 the 
policyholder’s customer filed suit, alleging loss of use of software 
and lost or corrupted patient account data incorporated therein.158  
The Cincinnati Insurance court concluded that such data was not 
tangible property and that therefore, there was no coverage for the 
policyholder defendant under the property damage clause of its 
CGL policy.159 
In Ward General Insurance Services, Inc. v. Employers Fire Insurance 
Co.,160 the policyholder’s data was deleted during an upgrade to the 
policyholder’s computer systems.161  The policyholder sought first-
party coverage for the cost of recovering the data and for the 
business interruption loss.162  The California Court of Appeals, 
citing Seagate Technology, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.163 
and America Online, held that because the operative terms “physical 
loss” and “tangible property” were undefined in the policy, the 
normal meaning of those words should be examined and that 
 
 150. Id. at *2-4. 
 151. 207 F. Supp. 2d 459 (E.D. Va. 2002). 
 152. Id. at 462. 
 153. Id. at 469-70.  But see Am. Online, Inc. v. Nat’l Health Care Disc., Inc., 121 
F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1274 n.18 (N.D. Iowa 2000). 
 154. Computer Corner, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 46 P.3d 1264 (N.M. 
Ct. App. 2002). 
 155. 119 S.W.3d 16 (Tex. App. 2003). 
 156. Id. at 27. 
 157. 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15859 (D. Kan. July 18, 2003). 
 158. Id. at *8. 
 159. Id. at *18-22. 
 160. 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). 
 161. Id. at 846. 
 162. Id. 
 163. 11 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1998). 
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“physical” meant having a material existence perceptible to the 
senses and that “tangible” meant capable of being perceived, 
especially by the sense of touch.164  Utilizing those definitions, the 
Court concluded that a database was not physical since it did not 
have a material existence.165 
D. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Commissioner of Revenue 
These developments helped add significance to the Minnesota 
Supreme Court’s 2004 Sprint Spectrum decision.166  In Sprint 
Spectrum, the question before the court was whether sales tax was 
due on capital equipment purchased by Sprint, which provides 
telephone service.167  Sprint argued that its purchase of equipment 
for its telephone service, like the purchase of equipment in Zip Sort, 
qualified for the tax exemption for capital used in manufacturing 
“tangible personal property.”168  The government contended that 
Sprint provided a telephone service, and thus did not manufacture 
tangible personal property.169  In a lengthy opinion, with an equally 
lengthy dissent, the court concluded that “[i]f the medium in 
which the information resides is merely incidental to the reason for 
the purchase, the transferred information is intangible property.  
But if the medium in which the information resides is essential or 
necessary to the reason for the purchase, then the transferred 
information is tangible property.”170  On that basis, the court 
determined that the telecommunications equipment qualified for 
the tax break.171 
The facts of Sprint Spectrum were established by stipulation.172  
The three appellants (collectively “relators”) provided different 
aspects of telephone services, including local, wireless, and long-
distance telephone service.173  All three appellants purchased 
equipment for their businesses and challenged the applicability of 
 
 164. Ward, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 851-52. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 676 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 
2004). 
 167. Id. at 657. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 658. 
 170. Id. at 663 (citing Zip Sort, Inc. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 567 N.W.2d 34, 40 
(Minn. 1997)). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. at 657. 
 173. Id. 
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sales tax on those purchases.174  The relators argued that they were 
eligible for a sales tax exemption on the equipment because the 
purchased equipment was “capital equipment” used in 
manufacturing “tangible personal property.”175  “Tangible personal 
property,” in turn, is defined as “corporeal personal property of any 
kind whatsoever, including property which is to become real 
property as a result of incorporation, attachment, or installation 
following its acquisition.”176 
The supreme court concluded that equipment used in 
providing telephone communications services to customers 
constituted capital equipment under the statutory definition, which 
included the definition of “tangible personal property.”177  In doing 
so, it relied heavily on its 1997 decisions in Zip Sort and NSP, in 
which it had ruled that bar codes and electricity were tangible 
personal property, and hence mail coding machines and electrical 
transformers were capital equipment that qualified for the sales tax 
exemption.178  As the Sprint Spectrum Court concluded in its 
discussion of NSP: 
As with electricity, telecommunications is corporeal 
personal property “of any kind whatsoever” and includes 
all things which may be perceived by any of the bodily 
senses, including, but not limited to, touch, sight, hearing 
and, in this case, can be precisely measured, directed and 
delivered for use by a retail customer.  Our traditional 
analysis and precedent would categorize this 
telecommunications equipment as refining or 
manufacturing a product “to be sold ultimately at 
retail.”179 
The Sprint Spectrum court buttressed its statutory interpretation 
argument by again examining the legislative history of the statute 
in question and reaffirming that the 1993 legislative amendment to 
the statute, substituting “tangible personal property” in place of the 
earlier language “a product,” intended no narrowing of the tax 
exemption.180 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 297A.01, subd. 16(a) (2000). 
 176. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 659 (citing MINN. STAT. § 297A.01, 
subd. 11 (2000) (current version at MINN. STAT. § 297A.61, subd. 10 (2002)). 
 177. Id. at 665. 
 178. Id. at 662-64. 
 179. Id. at 664; see also N. States Power Co. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 571 N.W.2d 
573, 576 (Minn. 1997). 
 180. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 664-65. 
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Finally, the Sprint Spectrum court abrogated Qwest, the earlier 
tax court decision that provided the basis for much of the tax court 
decision in Sprint Spectrum.  “Relying on a previous tax court 
decision, [Qwest], the tax court noted that ‘the common definition 
of ‘corporeal’ ‘does not include a product that can only be heard 
and not touched or seen.’”181  In particular, the supreme court 
concluded that the tax court holding in Qwest “directly 
contradicted our holding in NSP” that the legislature intended no 
narrowing of the exception by its amendment.182 
The Qwest tax court decision was itself based in large part on 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1990 edition’s definition of “tangible 
property” as “that which may be felt or touched[,] and is necessarily 
corporeal.”183  Thus, the Sprint Spectrum court also reviewed, but 
rejected, the argument advanced by the tax court (and by Justice 
Anderson in his dissent) that the requirement that the personal 
property be “corporeal” “does not include a product that can only 
be heard and not touched or seen . . . .”184  Indeed, Justice 
Anderson nonetheless argued that the supreme court improperly 
rejected Black’s 1994 definition of “corporeal property,” which 
provides: 
Such as affects the senses, and may been seen and 
handled, as opposed to incorporeal property, which 
cannot be seen or handled, and exists only in 
contemplation . . . . In Roman law, the distinction 
between things corporeal and incorporeal rested on the 
sense of touch; tangible objects only were considered 
corporeal.  In modern law, all things which may be 
perceived by any of the bodily senses are termed 
corporeal, although a common definition of the word includes 
merely that which can be touched and seen.185 
In response, the supreme court entered into an extended 
discussion of various dictionary definitions of “corporeal” and 
 
 181. Id. at 658 (citing Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v. Comm’r of Revenue, Nos. 7299-R, 
7308-R, and 7309-R, 2003 WL 21246600, at *5 (Minn. T.C. May 23, 2003) (quoting 
Qwest Corp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, Nos. 7214-R and 7283-R, 2001 WL 355861, at 
*3 (Minn. T.C. Apr. 2, 2001), abrogated by 676 N.W.2d 656 (Minn. 2004)). 
 182. Id. at 661 (citing N. States Power Co., 571 N.W.2d at 575). 
 183. Id. at 660-61. 
 184. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 2003 WL 21246600, at *5 (quoting Qwest, 2001 WL 
355861, at *3). 
 185. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 667 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
BLACK’S, supra note 116, at 343). 
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“tangible property.”186  It noted, for example, that the Black’s Law 
Dictionary definition had changed since the 1994 edition: “the 
1999 [Seventh] edition of Black’s revised the definition of 
‘corporeal property’ to ‘property that can be perceived.’”187  The 
Sprint Spectrum court then concluded: “While dictionary definitions 
are sometimes helpful in statutory interpretations, it would expand 
the power of a dictionary’s author for this court to rely solely on a 
portion of a specific dictionary text, or to overemphasize single 
words or examples within a specific dictionary entry.”188  Finally, the 
Sprint Spectrum Court noted while it referenced Black’s in Zip Sort, it 
did not rely on it but instead relied on Fingerhut in reaching its 
decision.189 
In short, the supreme court has wisely chosen not to bind itself 
to particular dictionary definitions but rather has clarified, albeit in 
a tax context, that “tangible property” will typically include 
electronic property such as telephone and electrical transmissions.  




 186. Id. at 662. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 663.  Of course, the one area in which tax law and insurance law do 
differ is that while the courts have looked to the “common” definition of a term in 
construing statutory language in insurance coverage, law terms undefined in the 
policy should be construed narrowly in favor of coverage.  Compare Nadeau v. 
Austin Mut. Ins. Co., 350 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Minn. 1984) (“[T]he terms of a statute 
generally should be construed according to their plain and ordinary meaning.”) 
with Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 179 
(Minn. 1990) (“If the terms of an insurance policy are not specifically defined, 
they must be given their plain, ordinary and popular meaning . . . [but] 
[a]mbiguous terms in an insurance policy are to be resolved against the insurer 
and in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.”). 
 189. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 676 N.W.2d at 663. 
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